Insiders, Outsiders et le recrutement syndical

Michel Paul

Revue d'économie politique, 2012, vol. 122, issue 1, 89-112

Abstract: Trade union objectives are analysed in the literature by means of two canonical approaches, the median voter theorem and the membership maximization hypothesis, that are thought to be contradictories. The paper aims to show this assertion is misleading in the insider-outsider framework. To state this point, we propose a modified version of the Booth & Chatterji [1995] model in which membership is not compulsory by differentiating labour suppliers depending on whether they are employed or unemployed at the time of the bargain and we study a wage-offers game in which two organizations recruit with the workers by competing with the quality of the union goods. The main result is that the insiders? claim, unless the pool experiences some massive unemployment, is implemented at the equilibrium.

Keywords: insiders et outsiders; syndicats; revendications salariales; concurrence par la qualité; Insiders and Outsiders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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