Differentials in property Rights in a two-sector economy

Raul Caruso ()

Revue d'économie politique, 2012, vol. 122, issue 2, 257-278

Abstract: This paper presents a two-sector economy. In a contested sector two agents struggle to appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In an uncontested sector, they hold secure property rights over the production of some goods. Agents split their resource endowment between ?butter?, ?guns? and ?ice-cream?. The latter denote productive activities secure from appropriation. It is shown how improvements in productivity can countervail destructive impact of continuous conflicts. Eventually, the basic model is extended to consider a government and a rival group. A redistributive government can boost production in the uncontested sector, but at a higher level of ?guns?.

Keywords: property rights; conflict; productive and unproductive Activities; Butte (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Differentials in Property Rights in a two sector-economy (2012)
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