Une mesure expérimentale de la discrimination homme-femme à l'embauche
David Masclet () and
Emmanuel Peterle ()
Revue d'économie politique, 2013, vol. 123, issue 3, 333-351
There are numerous examples of discrimination in labor market ranging from wage discrimination to discrimination in hiring decisions. The aim of this paper is to provide evidence of hiring discrimination, using a real effort experiment. In this experiment, the employer (principal) has to hire an employee (agent) in order to provide effort during a production task. The main result of this study is that in the absence of relevant information on productivity, the principal uses signals such as gender or level of study to make his hiring decisions. These results support the existence of discrimination against females. Moreover, this discrimination does not rely on in-group favoritism and is more likely to be explained by statistical discrimination. We show, thanks to this study, that laboratory experiments are a relevant tool to investigate the mechanisms underlying discrimination, as well as the efficiency of the actions aiming to prevent it.
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Working Paper: Une mesure expérimentale de la discrimination homme-femme à l'embauche (2013)
Working Paper: Une mesure expérimentale de la discrimination homme-femme à l’embauche (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_233_0333
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