Incitations managériales dans un duopole mixte: cas de la privatisation partielle de la firme publique

Kadohognon Ouattara

Revue d'économie politique, 2013, vol. 123, issue 4, 495-517

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of managerial incentive contracts in a game where a firm that is owned jointly by both the private and public sectors (a semi-public firm) competes with a private firm. The incentive scheme of semi-public firm managers is assumed to reflect the social goals of public authority. It was found that the strategic use of managerial incentive contracts can contribute to improve social welfare. Furthermore, the use of incentive contracts may have similar competitive effects than those of privatization.

Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REDP_234_0495 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2013-4-page-495.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_234_0495

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie politique from Dalloz
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().