Dynamique de l’action collective, taille du groupe et degré de rivalité de la rente

Guillaume Cheikbossian

Revue d'économie politique, 2015, vol. 125, issue 1, 145-169

Abstract: In this paper, we study the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking in order to challenge the position of an incumbent for the award of a rent. Specifically, we consider a repeated game in which group members use Nash reversion strategies to support cooperative behavior within the group. In addition, the rent underlying the conflict has a varying mix of public and private characteristics between a public (non-divisible) good and a private (divisible) good. We then show that cooperation within the group is more difficult to sustain as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the degree of rivalry of the rent increases. However, the larger the size of the community, the more its members are able to support within-group cooperation no matter how private (or public) the rent.

Keywords: Rent-seeking; Collective Action; Cooperation; Repeated Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REDP_251_0145 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2015-1-page-145.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_251_0145

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie politique from Dalloz
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().