Incentives and manipulability in Choice Modeling. Some experimental results

Pere Riera and Olga Lucia Manrique

Revue d'économie politique, 2015, vol. 125, issue 2, 197-207

Abstract: From a mechanism design perspective, a valuation exercise can be analyzed in terms of its incentive compatibility. However, a non-incentive compatible exercise does not automatically imply that participants will engage in strategic behavior. The likelihood of this behavior can be tested through lab experiments. In this regard, choice modeling has received little attention compared to the contingent valuation method. This article reports a laboratory experiment using contingent grouping, a choice modeling valuation variant. The main conclusion is that the manipulability of this type of valuation exercises may be too difficult to realize by the participants to behave strategically ? unless they are made aware in advance.

Keywords: Incentive compatibility; contingent grouping; contingent valuation; choice experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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