La régulation asymétrique: un mécanisme de financement des coûts échoués irrécupérables

Cédric Clastres

Revue d'économie politique, 2016, vol. 126, issue 1, 89-126

Abstract: Asymetric regulation in networks industries have impacted regulatory and competitive contexts. Questions of economic efficiency, collusion or fundings of sunk stranded costs go with asymetric regulation. Thus, regulators must adapt their policies to internalise these questions and to maximise the welfare. We show with a Cournot model regulators could fund sunk stranded costs, keeping allocative efficiency constant. Positive results on welfare rely on incumbent?s efficiency and on prices of alternative supplies.

Keywords: Asymetric regulation; sunk stranded costs; forced competition; capacity constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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