Assurance de responsabilité, assurance de choses et dommages environnementaux: une analyse économique de la directive 2004/35/CE
Claude Fluet ()
Revue d'économie politique, 2016, vol. 126, issue 2, 193-211
In the traditional civil liability system, legal damages seek in principle to financially compensate victims for their losses (economic loss or personal injury). By contrast, legal damages under the environmental liability system prescribed by the European Commission Directive?2004/35/CE are computed on the basis of the cost of restoring the environment. When full restoration is not economically reasonable, damages include an imputation for the value of the residual environmental loss which is not paid as financial compensation to the populations directly harmed but should be allocated to environmental measures of a general nature. I argue that the environmental liability system is on the whole consistent with the prescriptions of a standard law and economics analysis, except for the conservationist stance in the allocation of the imputation for the residual environmental harm which may be interpreted as a policy of earmarked taxes.
Keywords: environmental liability; ecological damage; legal damages; insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_262_0193
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Revue d'économie politique from Dalloz
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().