The Paris Agreement as a step backward to gain momentum: Lessons from and for theory

Alejandro Caparrós

Revue d'économie politique, 2016, vol. 126, issue 3, 347-356

Abstract: The Paris Agreement has moved us backward from a world where binding burden-sharing agreements like the Kyoto Protocol were the standard, to a world where climate policy is reduced to pledge and review. Nevertheless, this has allowed climate policy to gain new momentum. This paper argues that game theoretical analyses of International Environmental Agreements have not incorporated this change yet, as they were all designed to analyze burden sharing agreements, or agreements where signatories essentially become one player. Despite this fact, some relevant insights from this literature are still relevant to guiding future climate policy in the new context.

Keywords: climate change; international negotiations; bargaining theory; game theory; international environmental agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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