Quelle gouvernance pour le financement immobilier ? Le cas du Crédit Foncier de France au XIX e siècle

David Le Bris

Revue d'économie politique, 2016, vol. 126, issue 4, 593-616

Abstract: The Foncier benefits from unusual governance, which is a source of inspiration since it has amply fulfilled its real-estate financing mission. The strong agency conflict between private shareholders and state-appointed managers is resolved by a highly involved board and the need to buy a substantial number of shares held as guarantee for good management. Conflicts between bond holders and both managers and shareholders about the risk level taken by the bank are resolved by the legal prohibition on issuing bonds without quality loans as collateral, monthly publication of its balance sheet and imposition of a ?Basel ratio? of 5 %.

Keywords: Governance; Bank; History; Agency Theory; Real-estate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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