Quality of Goods and Labor Efficiency in Perfect and Asymmetric Information Environments

Farah Hachicha

Revue d'économie politique, 2016, vol. 126, issue 5, 871-894

Abstract: This paper studies how to design optimal portfolio of contracts between a firm, his consumers and his workers when quality of good and quality of labor are unobservable. Under complete information every body gets paid at his marginal cost. Under asymmetric information environment, it is shown that contrary to the literature on the goods market there is no distortion of the low level of quality of good but there is an increase of high quality of good. On the labor market, there is no distortion of high type worker but there is a distortion for the low type worker: his second best effort is lower than in complete information.

Keywords: Quality of Good; quality of Labor; firm design; labeling good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REDP_265_0871 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2016-5-page-871.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_265_0871

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie politique from Dalloz
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().