Les modèles de « rivalité coercitive » dans l’analyse économique des conflits
Antoine Pietri ()
Revue d'économie politique, 2017, vol. 127, issue 3, 307-352
This survey explores the use of models derived from contest theory in conflict theory (i.e. guns Vs butter models). Initially introduced by Hirshleifer during the late?1980s, these models offer a particular reading grid of conflicts as ?costly lotteries?. In such setting, several agents devote unproductive resources to defeat their rivals and win a prize at stake. We underline the decisive role of guns Vs butter models in integrating conflicts in the mainstream economics, while maintaining links with military operational researches. We particularly focus on the Contest Success Function which is the cornerstone of guns Vs butter models. Given the significant development of this literature during the last two decades, we devote a large part of the present survey to new results gained by using network theory or laboratory experiments.
Keywords: conflicts; contest theory; rivalry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_273_0307
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