The stability of group formation

Gabrielle Demange

Revue d'économie politique, 2017, vol. 127, issue 4, 495-516

Abstract: In a large range of political and economic situations, the formation of coordinated groups is driven by two opposite forces: increasing returns to size on the one hand, the heterogeneity of preferences, which hampers coordination, on the other. An important question is whether competitive pressures, such as described by free mobility and free entry, lead to an efficient and stable organization of the society into possibly several self-sufficient groups. This paper discusses theoretical approaches to this question as well as recent empirical studies.

Keywords: coalition structures; stability; free mobility; free entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REDP_274_0495 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2017-4-page-495.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
Working Paper: The stability of group formation (2017)
Working Paper: The stability of group formation (2017)
Working Paper: The stability of group formation (2017)
Working Paper: The stability of group formation (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_274_0495

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie politique from Dalloz
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().