Coordination, Team Reasoning, and Solution Thinking

Francesco Guala

Revue d'économie politique, 2018, vol. 128, issue 3, 355-372

Abstract: Adam Morton has argued that a special kind of simulation, called ?solution thinking?, explains successful coordination in games of strategic interaction. In this paper I develop Morton?s idea arguing that (i) simulation explains how focal points generate common beliefs; and (ii) people engage in a special type of simulation when they reason as a team. An important feature of solution thinking is that common beliefs are an output, rather than an input, of coordination. This suggests that they may play a less central role in sustaining coordination than previous theorists have assumed.

Keywords: coordination; simulation; common knowledge; mindreading; team reasoning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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