Incitations et Redistribution en France, 2010-2011

Stephane Gauthier and Robin Le Huérou-Kérisel

Revue d'économie politique, 2020, vol. 130, issue 3, 345-371

Abstract: We empirically assess the limits to redistribution due to asymmetric information between a tax authority and taxpayers in an optimal taxation model with both direct (income) and indirect (consumption) taxes. Using data from the French consumer expenditure survey ?Budget de Famille? released in 2011, we find that the tax system favors middle class households from the 6-th decile in the distribution of consumption expenditures. The innovation of our paper is to identify the incentive constraint where top income earners are ready to relax labor effort to mimic the favored middle class households as being the only ones that put limits to the redistribution toward the middle class.

Keywords: incentives; taxation; redistribution; Aids (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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