Biens méritoires et nudges dans le domaine de la santé publique

Fabienne Oguer

Revue d'économie politique, 2020, vol. 130, issue 5, 799-821

Abstract: This article refers to (de) merit goods in public health (immunization, screening for cancer or cholesterol, smoking). It uses a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach incorporating nudges modeled as a degree of interventionism in between weak and strong paternalism. The complete information game and the signaling game indicate that if the State is sufficiently paternalist, he shall use nudges to initiate a good behavior from the individual, and heavy handed measures in the case of addiction or externalities. Since optimal level of nudges is a private information, the State can ask a regulator to advise him on the degree of interventionism he must choose. The design information game displays that the influence of the regulator is reduced by the additional information that the State can acquire on the type of the selected individual.

Keywords: merit good; nudge; non cooperative game; information design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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