Rivalités régionales et financements des insurrections

Mahdi Fawaz

Revue d'économie politique, 2021, vol. 131, issue 6, 927-950

Abstract: Direct inter-state wars have become particularly constraining and the strategy of funding rebel groups located in rival countries has many advantages. By exploiting the resources at their disposal, rentier states can finance insurgency activities in rival countries. This paper empirically demonstrates that for a given country, the natural resource rents available to its rivals have a systematic effect on its likelihood of experiencing civil war. This result is stable when we control only for rents from oil exports. Classification JEL: C33; D74; O13; Q34; Q35

Keywords: Interstate rivalry; civil war; external support; state capacity; opportunity cost ofinsurrection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REDP_316_0107 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2021-6-page-927.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_316_0107

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie politique from Dalloz
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().