A Cooperative Game Approach to Integrated Healthcare

Guillaume Sekli

Revue d'économie politique, 2023, vol. 133, issue 5, 741-764

Abstract: This article focuses on the sharing of a bundled payment for integrated healthcare. We model this problem by means of cooperative game theory. Various approaches are considered, each of which gives rise to a particular cooperative game, and make it possible to take the chronology of medical events into account. The Shapley value, a priority rule and a proportional allocation rule are used to (partially) refund the healthcare professionals on the basis of the fee paid by the patient. We establish some properties of these allocation rules. We also show that the core of some of these aformentioned games is non-empty and can contain these allocation rules.

Keywords: Integrated Healthcare; Healthcare chain; Chronic diseases; Shapley value; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REDP_335_0741 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2023-5-page-741.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_335_0741

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie politique from Dalloz
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().