Dynamique des conglomérats et politique antitrust

Armel Jacques

Revue d'économie politique, 2023, vol. 133, issue 6, 997-1038

Abstract: Changes in the organisation chosen by groups wishing to engage in collusion practices in several markets are analysed. If the synergies between the different activities are strong, the groups bring together their activities within a conglomerate. Although synergies are weak, the groups prefer to divide their different activities into several autonomous firms when they engage in collusion in several markets. When the competition authority dissolves one of the collusion agreements, the groups merge to combine their activities and benefit from the potential synergies. This dynamic of the group organisation reveals a conglomerate discount. Codes JEL: L41, K21, D43, G34

Keywords: Conglomerates; collusion; multimarket contacts; competition policy; conglomerate discount (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 G34 K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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