Répression du stationnement frauduleux et congestion routière urbaine. Une approche théorique

Romain Petiot

Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, 2002, vol. avril, issue 2, 275-298

Abstract: The article deals with a non-free parking violation economic analysis. Based on a parking behavior model, the analysis rests on the economics of crime principles. The results show that the choice of the fine level has an impact both on the travel demand and on the modal share. In particular in the case of hypercongestion, the increase in the fine brings the risk-neutral user an advantage of driving and breaking the parking law. This result leads to reject the consensual policy, which prescribes the systematic increase in the fine to deter the parking meter non-compliance within the framework of the travel calming policy. Those results are confirmed by the numerical simulations. Classification JEL : R48, K42.

Keywords: public economics; transport economics; congestion; pricing; economics of crime; illegal behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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