Stratégies de coopération fiscale horizontale entre collectivités locales de même taille: une analyse fondée sur la théorie des jeux

Myriam Morer

Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, 2003, vol. février, issue 1, 83-102

Abstract: Thanks to games theory and within the french institutional framework, the aim of this paper is first to explain why we observe a spontaneous tax competition between local governments with similar size and then to show that « l?intercommunalité » in other words consolidation of municipalities proposed by public authorities, is the only solution to be considered. Classification JEL : H7, R3, R5.

Keywords: tax cooperation; tax competition; local governments; games theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H7 R3 R5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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