Note de Recherche. L'électeur médian est-il vraiment décisif ?. Un examen des communes françaises

Benoît Le Maux

Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, 2007, vol. décembre, issue 5, 921-944

Abstract: This article first presents a general model of public good provision in representative democracies : depending on the elected representative?s bureaucratic power, the level of public expenditures can be a function or not of the income and the tax base of the median voter. Following the approach of GUENGANT et al. (2002), the two possible specifications are afterwards tested on the whole set of French municipalities. The results of the tests (encompassing F-test, J-test of DAVIDSON and MacKINNON, JA-test of FISHER and MCALEER, COX?s test) support the model where the expenditures are not a function of the median characteristics. However, the elected representatives? bureaucratic power seems to be less important in small municipalities.

Keywords: public goods; local governments; median voter; bureaucracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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