Opportunisme ou équité ? Le cas des contrats d'approvisionnement de défense

Jean-Michel Oudot and Claude Menard

Revue française d'économie, 2009, vol. Volume XXIV, issue 3, 195-226

Abstract: How are extra costs resulting from the occurrence of unanticipated risks allocated in a procurement setting? This paper develops a theoretical framework combining transaction cost economics with equity theory in order to explain why parties endorse cooperative strategies, basically a 50-50 sharing rule, that prevail over their propensity to behave opportunistically. We derive two propositions that we test on a dataset of 48 contracts in the French defense procurement. We find that perception of equity turns out to be a key factor in the contractual relationship. This interpretation challenges the prevailing interpretation of a key assumption in transaction cost economics.

Date: 2009
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Journal Article: Opportunisme ou équité ? Le cas des contrats d’approvisionnement de défense (2010)
Working Paper: Opportunisme ou équité ? Le cas des contrats d'approvisionnement de défense (2010)
Working Paper: Opportunisme ou équité ? Le cas des contrats d'approvisionnement de défense (2010)
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