Construction de l'Etat, leadership et démocratie locale

Roger Myerson

Revue française d'économie, 2011, vol. Volume XXVI, issue 2, 3-21

Abstract: Political parties and institutions are established by recognized leaders who maintain reputations for reliably rewarding their supporters. To compete for power in any political system, a leader needs to build a base of active supporters, but their behavior cannot be directly observed by others (moral hazard problem). The essential key to motivating this base is the leader?s reputation for distributing patronage benefits to his supporters. The paper explains why a mix of leadership and patronage is necessary to curb the negative effects of moral hazard when building an independent State.

Date: 2011
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