Le comportement d'enchérisseur dans une enchère conséquentialiste au second prix

Jason Shogren and Lusine Tadevosyan

Revue française d'économie, 2011, vol. Volume XXVI, issue 3, 13-28

Abstract: Using experimental auctions to reveal the demand for new food products requires a good understanding on how preference elicitation mechanisms function under alternative assumptions. One recent idea argues that people will take a valuation exercise more seriously and state their preferences more sincerely if an incentive compatible mechanism is consequential - a positive probability their bid is binding in that they will actually have to pay for the good in question. We explore the robustness of this consequential assumption by examining bidding behavior within a consequential induced value second-price auction. Bidders bid knowing there is some probability the auction will or will not be binding. Our results are bidding behavior in a consequential auction was suboptimal. Rather bidding behavior was truth revealing only if the auction was 100% binding.

Date: 2011
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