Critères stricts de rationalité pour les comportements stratégiques

Robert Wilson ()

Revue française d'économie, 2012, vol. Volume XXVII, issue 3, 3-17

Abstract: Can there be a theory of rational decision making in multi-person contexts that is nearly as complete as it is for single-person contexts ? I show that one can answer the question positively for finite dynamic games with two players, perfect recall and generic payoffs. I establish four axioms that exactly characterize the stability condition for rational behavior in strategic interactions given by Jean-François Mertens en 1991.

Date: 2012
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