Jugement majoritaire versus vote majoritaire. ( via les présidentielles 2011-2012)

Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki

Revue française d'économie, 2012, vol. Volume XXVII, issue 4, 11-44

Abstract: The serious deficiencies of majority voting in both theory and practice are shown via recent experimental results. The fact is that the winner of an election is highly dependent on minor candidacies and is not only the outcome of the electorate?s will (Arrow?s paradox). A remedy is proposed : more information must be submitted by voters and the meaning of « majority » must be reformulated. Majority judgment asks voters to grade the candidates in a common scale of evaluation. The final grade of each candidate is decided by a majority. The candidate evaluated best is the winner.

Date: 2012
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