L’impact économique du droit de préemption dans une procédure de vente

Karine Brisset, François Cochard and François Maréchal

Revue française d'économie, 2015, vol. Volume XXX, issue 2, 217-255

Abstract: The right of first refusal clause entitles its holder to purchase an asset on the same terms as those accepted by a third party. This paper first analyses parties? incentives to include this clause in a private contract. It then examines the seller?s incentives to grant this right when he is not committed a priori. The external consequences of this right are also studied. Finally, the paper focuses on the right of first offer, which requires the seller to first offer the right-holder to buy the asset, and prohibits him from subsequently selling it to another buyer on better conditions.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RFE_152_0217 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-d-economie-2015-2-page-217.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:rferfe:rfe_152_0217

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue française d'économie from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().