Evasion fiscale et croissance: un cadre théorique simple
Leila Ali Aga and
Patrick Villieu ()
Revue française d'économie, 2016, vol. Volume XXXI, issue 2, 27-57
This paper presents an endogenous growth model with productive public spending and tax evasion. Corrupt tax officials deliver corruption services allowing households to partially evade taxes. Therefore, corruption induces a a loss of resources for public finances. To reduce this loss, the government can implement anti-corruption policies or increase tax-rates. We especially highlight the existence of a nonlinear relationship between corruption and growth. Effectively, the fight against corruption may have, in some configurations, a cost in terms of growth, illustrating some ??paradoxes?? raised by recent empirical literature on the issue.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:rferfe:rfe_162_0027
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Revue française d'économie from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().