Négociation contrainte et comportement de négociation. Une analyse expérimentale
Eve-Angeline Lambert and
Revue française d'économie, 2017, vol. XXXII, issue 3, 46-89
In some disputes, parties have the obligation to negotiate before an external solution is imposed to them. We analyze both theoretically and experimentally the impact of such a constraint on the bargaining behavior of agents and on the negotiation result. We show that individuals who are forced to bargain are significantly more aggressive than those who chose to bargain, and this is mainly due to the constraint itself. This implies that the fact of being constrained leads individuals to not behave the same way as if they had made this choice initially, which implies that the way the bargaining is implemented is not neutral and modifies its result. This characteristic should be considered in the context of the enforcement of judicial procedure of individual and collective disputes’ resolution.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:rferfe:rfe_173_0046
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