Tests génétiques prédictifs et marchés de l’assurance santé

Stéphane Alcenat

Revue française d'économie, 2019, vol. XXXIV, issue 2, 249-302

Abstract: This paper provides an economic analysis of the implications of predictive genetic testing on the health insurance markets. This analysis shows that the choice of a regulation results from a trade-off between the maximization of ex ante social welfare and engagement in prevention actions. Indeed, the optimal trade-off depends on the way information acquisition impacts prevention and revelation behaviors of insured, as well as on its impact on genetic discrimination and the type of insurance contracts.

Date: 2019
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