Guerre et paix: les vertus d’une séparation des pouvoirs décisionnels

Antonis Adam and Petros Sekeris

Revue française d'économie, 2019, vol. XXXIV, issue 3, 23-54

Abstract: In this paper we develop a novel theoretical argument that explains how peace can be preserved in « Guns and Butter » models of conflict. Our model predicts that peace can emerge even in zero-sum games as long as the arming and war decisions are assigned to different players, and that they communicate imperfectly. We propose an application of our model to the Civilian-Military relations, and we study its implications on the propensity to observe international conflicts.

Date: 2019
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