Faut-il détruire les ennemis de nos adversaires ? Besoin d’ennemis et réputation dans un conflit électoral
Maxime Menuet and
Patrick Villieu ()
Revue française d'économie, 2019, vol. XXXIV, issue 3, 55-81
Why do Politicians not solve social problems? One reason may be that such problems are difficult to solve, or that Politicians are incompetent. But there is another reason: in representative democracies, competent Politicians may have the incentive not to solve problems in order to conserve an electoral advantage. Standard career concern models show that reputational strengths can, to some extent, circumvent Politicians incentives not to address the problems. But if Politicians’ career also depends on their need to keep the enemies alive, the amount of reforms they implement will result from the trade-off between reputation and the “need for enemies”. Moreover, Politicians can be induced to solve as a priority the problems for which they are less skilled, in order to destroy the comparative advantage of their challengers.
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Working Paper: Faut-il détruire les ennemis de nos adversaires ? Besoin d’ennemis et réputation dans un conflit électoral (2019)
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