Loi de Wagner et politiques culturelles: les vertus du bras armé

Pierre Cartigny and Luc Champarnaud

Revue française d'économie, 2019, vol. XXXIV, issue 4, 3-24

Abstract: We compare the dynamic performance of two models of public intervention in the cultural sector : A centralized ministry’à la française’ and a so-called arm’s length bodies, more British. We study the solutions of a dynamic game where, by hypothesis, the agencies are likely to resist Wagner’s law better than a central regulator, because they can disengage from public funding projects and thus approach the optimal dynamic. The non-cooperative behavior of the agencies creates strategic biases that the center can partially correct. The problem of quality is also addressed.

Date: 2019
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