Jensen et Meckling trente ans après
Jacques Thépot ()
Revue française de gestion, 2007, vol. n° 175, issue 6, 15-22
The thirty old article of Jensen & Meckling (1976), belongs to the most cited papers in Management. It is today a classical reference in all the textbooks of Corporate Finance as the seminal contribution to the separation and control issue which has become a central piece of governance theory. This paper is aimed at exhibiting the underlying game-theoretic structure of Jensen and Meckling?s equity model. Besides simplifying the proofs and the arguments, this approach highlights the relationship between this microeconomic model and the agency theory which will be developed further
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:rfglav:rfg_175_0015
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