Stratégies de vote en AG face aux résolutions externes
Guillaume Chevillon () and
Revue française de gestion, 2009, vol. n° 198-199, issue 8, 277-296
This article examines the respective role of finance (shareholders) and management (board of directors) in annual meetings by examining votes on shareholder proposals. The empirical study of French companies from the SBF 250 between 2005 and 2008 provides the structural elements explaining the adoption and the approval of shareholder sponsored resolutions. In line with the theoretical analysis, we find evidence for the role of outside observers such as the French Asset Management Association in facilitating shareholder coalitions?; moreover, the majority rule does not influence the results of voting on resolutions.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:rfglav:rfg_198_0277
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