Activisme et Proxy Fight. Quand les actionnaires déclarent la guerre au management

Michel Albouy and Alain Schatt

Revue française de gestion, 2009, vol. n° 198-199, issue 8, 297-315

Abstract: Minority shareholders have heterogeneous expectations : employees or suppliers, who hold shares, are not only concerned with dividends or an increase in the value of the shares, unlike ?financial? shareholders. Sometimes, these shareholders are unsatisfied by certain strategic or operational decisions taken by managers. Then, they have to decide how to protect their interests. This article focus on a special mechanism of protection : the proxy fight. We emphasize the main difficulties faced by shareholders who are engaged in such battles, the key factors of success, as well as the consequences of these battles on the financial performance of companies.

Date: 2009
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