L'investissement dans la réputation par les auditeurs et les analystes financiers

Véronique Bessière and Alain Schatt

Revue française de gestion, 2010, vol. n° 207, issue 8, 169-180

Abstract: This article focuses on investment in reputation. Its analysis on financial markets is particularly relevant because it underlines the trade-off between short-run profits generated by an informational advantage and long-run benefits extracted from a good reputation. We focus on two major informational intermediaries on security markets: auditors and analysts. They both have a strong economic incentive to develop their reputation because they repeatedly interact with investors who demand reliable information on companies for managing their portfolios. However several financial scandals during the last decade address questions on incentive to invest in reputation and on restraints that could curtail this investment.

Date: 2010
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