Le comply or explain, un avatar de l' accountability

Anne-Laure Boncori and Isabelle Cadet

Revue française de gestion, 2013, vol. N° 237, issue 8, 35-55

Abstract: To what extent the adoption of the comply or explain mechanism by various European Union countries, and in particularly by France, turns out to be a perverted form of accountability ? That is the very subject of this transdisciplinary article relating to codes of good governance. Flexibility in the implementation of this mechanism appears inversely proportional to the rigor required by a high level of transparency. The evolution of corporate practices reveals the rise of conformism that runs the risk of a perversion of principles. Indeed, the comply or explain logic tends to substitute to the accountability principle an optional application of private norms associated with corporate governance.

Date: 2013
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