Gouvernance des clubs de football professionnels. Entre régulation et contrainte budgétaire

Nadine Dermit-Richard, Nicolas Scelles and Barbara Evrard

Revue française de gestion, 2019, vol. N° 279, issue 2, 53-72

Abstract: By analysing clubs? individual behaviour, this research suggests a typology based on their level of budget constraint, induced by the capacity of their shareholders to fund losses. It is thus possible to conclude that only a very small number of clubs operate under a ?soft? budget constraint (SBC) characterising a ?bad? governance (Andreff, 2009). This research also enables to show that clubs adapt their behaviour to the requirements of the sectorial regulation that applies to them, transferring to the latter a share of responsibility in the governance of these organisations.

Date: 2019
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