Les contrats relationnels et la théorie de l'imprévision

Hugues Bouthinon-Dumas

Revue internationale de droit économique, 2001, vol. t. XV, 3, issue 3, 339-373

Abstract: The American theorist Ian R. Macneil makes a distinction between «relational contracts » and « discrete transactions ». The purpose of this article is to investigate the peculiarities of the relational contracts and the possibility to adapt some clauses of the agreement,even against one party?s will. A relational contract is a legal relation which aims to facilitate cooperation based on interdependence between the parties. That sort of contractis mainly designed to create and preserve an economic structure intented by the parties. The fulfilment of a relational contract may require its instrumental clauses to be adapted in order to cope with unexpected circumstances affecting the balance of the parties? obligations. This analysis contrasts with the traditional French contract law under which a judge is not allowed to adapt any clause of a private contract, being relational or not.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RIDE_153_0339 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-droi ... -2001-3-page-339.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:riddbu:ride_153_0339

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue internationale de droit économique from De Boeck Université
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().