Quelles sanctions contre les cartels ?. Une perspective économique

Emmanuel Combe

Revue internationale de droit économique, 2006, vol. t. XX, 1, issue 1, 11-46

Abstract: Despite an increase since the 1990s, the level of fines imposed by antitrust authorities on cartels remains inadequate in light of the amount of illegal profits and the low probability of detection. In this paper, we show that the theory of ?optimal sanctions? requires not only a significant increase of administrative fines but also the development of civil actions and penal sanctions against individuals.

Keywords: civil action; antitrust; fines; cartel; deterrence; competition law; optimal sanction; criminal sanction; treble damage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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