Le droit de la concurrence et les procédures négociées

Arnold Vialfont

Revue internationale de droit économique, 2007, vol. t. XXI, 2, issue 2, 157-184

Abstract: We examine the antitrust enforcement policies of the European Commission and of the French Competition Council. Negotiated procedures ? i.e. leniency programmes, commitments and ?no-contest? procedures ? may improve the efficiency of the intervention of an authority when deterrence has not come from the market, but also when fines are not optimal to incite competitive behavior in the future. These three negotiated procedures consist in a reduction of the fine that may be imposed on firms when they cooperate by providing evidence of the illegal conduct or give information of the existence of such conduct. They are part of an optimal enforcement practice in that they allow to optimize it. We also examine their interaction with other antitrust provisions.

Keywords: ntitrust; leniency; commitments; plea-bargaining; private enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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