Régulation de la qualité des services juridiques et gouvernance de la profession d’avocat
Camille Chaserant () and
Revue internationale de droit économique, 2015, vol. t. XXIX, issue 3, 333-356
The reforms dealing with the regulation of legal services that are delivered by lawyers usually assume homogeneous legal services and support deregulatory prescriptions for the market for legal services. Assuming heterogeneous legal services, we distinguish between legal services characterized by credence, search, and experience good features. We argue that, theoretically, market mechanisms relying on lawyers? individual reputation are able to ensure the high quality of the legal services characterized by search and experience features. However, a regulation of legal services with credence good features is needed. Then, using recent advances in the economics of self- and external regulation, we argue that regulations should be implemented either by the legal profession or by an external regulator depending on the costs and benefits associated with both types of regulation.
Keywords: legal profession; lawyer; legal services; regulation; credence good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Régulation de la qualité des services juridiques et gouvernance de la profession d’avocat (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:riddbu:ride_293_0333
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