‪Le contrôle de la recherche d’emploi et les sanctions‪

Gwenn Parent

Travail et Emploi, 2014, vol. n° 139, issue 3, 91-104

Abstract: Job search monitoring consists in verifying that a jobseeker has engaged in sufficient job search activities to continue qualifying for and receiving unemployment benefits. A sanction consists in reducing ? or even withdrawing ? unemployment benefits if a jobseeker doesn?t meet the requirements of the public employment service (PES). This article presents a literature review of the main European experiences and micro-econometric evaluations of job search monitoring and sanctions. These evaluations show that monitoring as well as sanctions have positive effects on the return to work of the unemployed, but negative ones on the quality of the jobs found. These activation mechanisms therefore induce job seekers to accept less stable and lower-paid jobs. They may also have penalizing effects on the subsequent career of sanctioned individuals and lead to eviction effects towards various forms of inactivity.

Keywords: randomized experiment; job search monitoring; sanctions; activation of the unemployed; return to work (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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