Monetary Consequences of Fiscal Stress in a Game Theoretic Framework
Dat Nguyen and
Viet Anh Hoang ()
Additional contact information
Viet Anh Hoang: Banking Department, University of Economics - The University of Danang, Vietnam
Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, 2020, vol. 9, issue special issue, 125-164
This paper maps Leeper and Walker (2011) model into a game theory framework to study about the strategic aspects of monetary and fiscal interaction under a fiscal stress caused by an ageing population problem. The paper reveals that the outcomes of the game depend on the parameters of the underlying model, the size of the projected transfers and the public inflation expectation. The findings show that commitment to the target (inflation, government transfers) plays a crucial role in the policy interaction.
Keywords: Monetary-fiscal interaction; Game theory; Ageing population; Dynamic leadership; Stochastic timing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E63 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cbk:journl:v:9:y:2020:i:si:p:125-164
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice from Central bank of Montenegro Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().