VOTING RULES AND REDISTRIBUTION: THE CASE OF THE RECENT ECONOMIC CRISIS

Daniel Duma
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Daniel Duma: BUCHAREST UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMIC STUDIES

Annals - Economy Series, 2015, vol. 3, 183-189

Abstract: Redistribution and the provision of public goods are understood as the basic functions of the state and decision over the share of each is ensured via incremental negotiation. Even slight variations in the parameters of voting rules may end up with different decisions despite similar preferences of voters. To illustrate this phenomenon, the different response in terms of redistribution effort to the recent economic crisis of 2008-2009 in advanced economies will be studied. Using country level data and accounting for the severity of the economic crisis, the budget constraints, the overall historical size of the welfare state and unemployment dynamics, it will be contended that the size of electoral districts and the embedded long-term incentives they create for policymakers matter in explaining the difference in short-term social expenditure increases across countries.

Keywords: voting rules; public choice; redistribution; economic crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cbu:jrnlec:y:2015:v:3:p:183-189

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