A Matter of Voice: The Case for Abolishing the 30 percent Rule for Pension Fund Investments

Poonam Puri
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Poonam Puri: York University

C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, 2009, issue 283

Abstract: Pension fund managers have devised ways to effectively skirt the rule that limits them to acquiring no more than 30 percent of the shares eligible to vote for the directors of a corporation. It’s time for regulators to enforce the rule or eliminate it entirely, thereby giving pension funds a voice commensurate with their equity stake.

Keywords: Canadian pension security; Canadian pension funds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G23 J32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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