Fixarea preturilor unei oferte publice ca raspuns la teoria jocurilor

Mihaela-Adina Mateescu, Elena Mosneanu and Roxana Vârban
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Mihaela-Adina Mateescu: Centre for Industrial Economics and Services, Romanian Academy, Bucharest
Elena Mosneanu: Centre for Industrial Economics and Services, Romanian Academy, Bucharest
Roxana Vârban: Centre for Industrial Economics and Services, Romanian Academy, Bucharest

Revista de Economie Industriala (Journal of Industrial Eonomics), 2005, vol. 3, issue 4, 13

Abstract: The succes of a public bid is depending on the buyer's price, and the price cannot be niether too large or small. To fix the price, the buyer has to take account on the shareholder behavior and company management, and also on a possible market competition. The game theory permits a better understanding of the real events on the market.

Date: 2005
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