Gradual Nash bargaining with endogenous agenda. A path-dependent model

Julian Arevalo ()
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Julian Arevalo: Universidad Externado de Colombia

Colombian Economic Journal, 2004, vol. 2, issue 1, 189-212

Abstract: This article proposes a methodology to attack the problem of considering the bargaining agenda as an endogenous phenomenon in gradual bargaining games, understood as path-dependent processes. Some short, medium and long term results for bargaining are presented, as well as a possible application of the model

Keywords: bargaining games; path-dependent processes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cej:primer:v:2:y:2004:i:1:p:189-212

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